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Institute of Psychology, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Beliefs about lazy and undeserving welfare recipients are widespread in liberal socie-
ties that consider that hard work and self-reliance—rather than need or entitlement—
should determine individuals’ outcomes (McNamee & Miller, 2004). In this view, the
welfare system is presented as leading to a culture of dependency that erodes both
self-reliance and community values by encouraging people to stay on benefits rather
than seek work. Conservative politicians and media often portray welfare recipients as
free riders prone to misuse benefits. The efficacy of such anti-welfare discourse on
public opinion is evidenced by social psychological research showing that negative
stereotypes of welfare recipients lead to decreased support for public welfare (Gilens,
1999; Henry, Reyna, & Weiner, 2004; Mullen & Skitka, 2009). However, little re-
search has studied the moderating conditions that might strengthen or weaken the
influence of negative welfare beliefs on citizens’ support for actual welfare policies
(see Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 2011, for an exception). Relying on
social representations theory (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Moscovici, 1961/
2008; Staerkle´, Cle´mence, & Spini, 2011), we examine in this article the role of two
factors moderating the relationship between dependency culture beliefs and welfare
support, namely the degree of deservingness of welfare target groups (old and sick vs.
unemployed), and the importance of meritocratic values present in the larger cultural
context.
Social representations theory describes the origins and social functions of shared
knowledge about socially relevant issues (for an overview, see Sammut, Andreouli,
Gaskell, & Valsiner, 2014). Essentially, the theory claims that individuals refer to
culturally elaborated, simplified, and stereotypical knowledge to understand and
make sense of social and political events. Such shared knowledge may find its origins
in mass communications by powerful political pressure groups whose aim is to justify
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or to promote political arrangements that are in their interest (Staerkle´, 2014).
Importantly, representations are not consensual, but individuals actively position
themselves in relation to the majority point of view, by endorsing or rejecting it.
Beliefs about welfare and welfare beneficiaries are a good example of social repre-
sentations, as they are widespread and at the center of political controversy. A large
literature has, for example, examined survey research on attitudes toward the welfare
state (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Bonoli, 2000; Jaeger, 2006a;
Mau, 2003; Svallfors, 1997). One common finding is that attitudes toward welfare
intervention largely depend on shared beliefs regarding the perceived deservingness of
certain beneficiary groups (Petersen et al., 2011; van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). Both
correlational and experimental research has shown that if a stereotype contains infor-
mation regarding the personal responsibility of the group members for their behaviors
(i.e., characteristics that are internal and controllable, such as being hardworking), it is
likely to be used to judge whether the group deserves sympathy and support (Henry
et al., 2004; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005; Rudolph, Roesch,
Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011).
In this article, however, we tackle another key representation in the welfare domain,
namely dependency culture beliefs that refer to the detrimental impact of institutional
support on the psychology of welfare beneficiaries. Such beliefs are part of neocon-
servative thinking and state that social benefits and services lead to lower willingness
to work (Mead, 1986; Murray, 1984) and to less concern for others (Etzioni, 1994).
They have recently been studied as ‘‘negative moral consequences’’ of the welfare
state (van Oorschot & Meuleman, 2012b; van Oorschot, Reeskens, & Meuleman,
2012). In this article, we examine the explanatory role of such beliefs in orienting
attitudes toward welfare policies, and propose that dependency culture beliefs are
conceptually and empirically different from deservingness beliefs. Although both are
detrimental to welfare support, perceived deservingness refers to individual failings
such as lacking work ethic, whereas dependency culture refers to beliefs about the
relationship between the beneficiary and welfare institutions he or she is allegedly
dependent on. Culture of dependency is thus viewed as an inevitable psychological
byproduct of overly generous welfare institutions rather than as an individual attribute
as such. Considering the prevalence of political and media debates around culture of
dependency (see e.g., Humphrys, 2013), we believe it is timely to offer an analysis of
the phenomenon.
Based on research showing that attitudes toward different target groups are at least
partially determined by different factors (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; van Oorschot
& Meuleman, 2012a), our first research question asks whether dependency culture
beliefs are stronger predictors of attitudes toward the (undeserving) unemployed than
toward the (deserving) old and sick. In Europe, survey research on the deservingness
of different beneficiary groups has shown that elderly as well as sick and disabled
people are seen as more deserving than unemployed people and immigrants, reflecting
the idea that not all groups are seen as equally responsible for their fate (van
Oorschot, 2006). Similarly, dependency culture beliefs are expected to have a stronger
negative effect on support for the unemployed than on support for the old and sick, as
ageing and illness are less likely viewed as consequences of institutional action than
being unemployed. In addition, the difference in support for the groups can be
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predicted from a self-interest perspective: More people are likely to benefit from and
therefore support services for the old and the sick than services to the unemployed
(Roller, 1999). Thinking of oneself as a potential beneficiary (as in the case of the old
and the sick) may weaken the perceived likelihood of falling into a culture of
dependency.
A social representations approach highlights the role of shared knowledge as a
determinant of political attitudes, in particular through the impact of ‘‘meta-repre-
sentations’’, that is, beliefs about the beliefs of other people (Elcheroth et al., 2011).
Acknowledging that citizens form political opinions with reference to beliefs held by
others (Inglehart, 1977; van Oorschot et al., 2012), recent research has begun inte-
grating measures of the national culture—sets of shared values and moral beliefs—as
predictors of individual opinions (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Kunovich &
Slomczynski, 2007; Sarrasin et al., 2012; van Oorschot et al., 2012). Research on
the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974, 1984) and on pluralistic ignorance
(Prentice & Miller, 1996) has also demonstrated how shared cultural norms and
values—social representations—orient policy attitudes.
Our second research question thus examines the effect of shared values and norms
that are prevalent in the larger cultural context on the link between perceived de-
pendency culture and welfare attitudes. Research has shown that perceived violations
of important values by others (or by institutions) are likely to elicit strong attitudinal
reactions (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Wetherell, Reyna, & Sadler, 2013). Hence, the more
dominant a value in a society, the more likely individuals will react strongly to
perceived violations of that value. In other words, dominant values, such as egalitar-
ianism or work ethic, will be used to evaluate the behaviors of individuals and groups
simply because they are more available in people’s minds (Breznau, 2010; Feldman,
2003; Staerkle´, Likki, & Scheidegger, 2012). Meritocracy is the notion that individuals
ought to be allocated social goods in proportion to their individual abilities and efforts
(Kluegel & Smith, 1986; McNamee & Miller, 2004). With respect to welfare, mer-
itocratic values of individual responsibility and hard work have been shown to be key
predictors of policy attitudes, such as rejection of public health care in the U.S.
(Wetherell et al., 2013). Hence, we expect the degree of societal meritocracy to de-
termine at least to some extent the importance of a perceived dependency culture in
predicting welfare attitudes: In contexts where values of meritocracy are dominant,
dependency culture beliefs should be stronger predictors of welfare support than in
contexts where such values are less central. To our knowledge, no study has yet
examined whether representations shared at the national level moderate the relation-
ship between beliefs about the detrimental effects of welfare institutions and attitudes
toward welfare policies.
In sum, based on the literature reviewed above, the first hypothesis states that
dependency culture beliefs have a stronger effect on support for the unemployed
than on support for the sick and the old. We do, however, expect a spillover effect
even on the sick and the old, where a perceived culture of dependency is generalized
to the sick and the old. The second hypothesis states that the role of dependency
culture beliefs in predicting welfare attitudes varies across countries as a function of
the societal degree of meritocracy, such that the relationship is stronger in countries
with higher levels of meritocracy.
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Data and Measures
To answer these questions, we used data from the 2008 wave of the European Social
Survey (ESS), a comparative biennial survey project. We used data from all 29
countries available,1 with 50,820 respondents.2 For each country, ESS offers a prob-
ability-based sample of at least 1500 respondents of 16 years. For the most part, data
were collected between fall 2008 and 2009. The response rates varied between 45.7%
(Croatia) and 78.7% (Cyprus).3 The countries included in the analyses as well as
descriptive statistics for the main variables can be found in the Appendix.
The data consists of individuals (level 1) nested within countries (level 2) so we
chose to use multilevel modeling instead of standard linear regression, using max-
imum likelihood estimation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The analyses were conducted
using nonweighted data, but we checked that using design weights provided by ESS
(that correct for the possible over- and underrepresentation of certain population
groups) yielded almost identical results to those using nonweighted data.
Dependency Culture Beliefs
Three items were used to create a measure of perceived dependency culture: ‘‘To
what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services (1) make people
lazy? (2) make people less willing to care for one another? (3) make people less willing
to look after themselves and their family?’’ Responses ranged from 1¼ disagree strongly
to 5¼ agree strongly. The reliability of the resulting scale was adequate, with
Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .74 to .92. Overall ¼ .85.4
Welfare Support
Following Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), we used two outcome measures for
welfare support. The first one measured support for the unemployed with a composite
score of the items: ‘‘How much responsibility you think governments should have to
(1) ensure a job for everyone who wants one? (2) ensure a reasonable standard of
living for the unemployed?’’ Overall correlation between the two items was .50
(p< .001). The second one measured support for the sick and the old5 with a composite
1With the exception of Austria where fieldwork was conducted 2 years later than in other countries.
2All cases with missing values on the predictor variables were deleted to compare the different multilevel
models, leaving 50,820 cases out of 56,752.
3Full information on precise fieldwork periods and response rates can be found on the ESS Web site
(http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4/deviations.html).
4We ran additional analyses to establish the content validity of the measures. A principal component
analysis of the three dependency culture belief items together with two items measuring perceived deserv-
ingness of beneficiaries revealed a two-dimensional structure in 11 countries and a one-dimensional struc-
ture in 18 countries. When analyzing the total sample of 29 countries, a two-dimensional solution explained
73.4% of the variance compared with 54.2% in the one-dimensional solution.
5Grouping together the old and the sick is justified by research showing that both groups are considered
as highly deserving (van Oorschot, 2006). We also checked that there were no differences in the interpret-
ation of the results when analyzing support for the old and support for the sick as two separate outcome
variables. The only effect that changed was the effect of education on support for the sick, which was non-
significant (as compared with a negative effect on support for the old). Full results for these analyses can be
obtained from the authors.
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score of the items: (1) ‘‘How much responsibility you think governments should have
to ensure adequate health care for the sick? (2) ensure a reasonable standard of living
for the old?’’ Overall correlation between the two items was .72 (p< .001).
Participants rated all items from 0¼Not governments’ responsibility at all to
10¼Entirely governments’ responsibility.6
Societal Level of Meritocracy
Meritocracy at the country level was measured by aggregating responses to the item
‘‘Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences
in talents and efforts’’ within each country. This aggregated measure reflects the
definition of meritocracy as the shared belief that individuals should receive social
goods in proportion to their individual abilities and efforts. It thereby assumes a
normative view of meritocracy that assesses the extent to which meritocratic principles
should organize the society (as opposed to factual or objective levels of meritocracy,
cf. Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007).
To demonstrate that dependency culture beliefs explain welfare support over and
above the effects of social position, we controlled for the effects of three measures of
social position, considered as proxies for self-interest (Jaeger, 2006b). Education was
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 0¼ not completed primary education to
6¼ second stage of tertiary. Subjective material insecurity was measured with a three-
item scale of perceived likelihood of life course events with negative material conse-
quences occurring in the next 12 months: (1) having less time for paid work than
desired because of the care given to family members, (2) not having enough money for
household necessities, and (3) not receiving health care in case of illness. Responses
ranged from 1¼ not at all likely to 4¼ very likely (¼ .48–.84). Finally, we also
included a measure of whether the respondents had ever been unemployed for a
period of more than 3 months (26.2% answered yes). These factors related to
social position were included in the models because previous research has shown
that they are potent predictors of welfare attitudes (Gelissen, 2000; Staerkle´ et al.,
2012; Svallfors, 1997).
We also included age, gender, and egalitarianism (measured with the item ‘‘For a
society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small’’) as
individual-level control variables, again to demonstrate the role played by the specific
construct of dependency culture beliefs.7
6For the four welfare support items, a principal component analysis across the 29 countries with the
default option (eigenvalues> 1) yielded a single factor explaining 62.8% of the variance. This reflects
common covariance that is due to the semantic proximity of the items (all were formulated as ‘‘government
responsibility’’ items). However, when constraining the number of factors to two, the differentiation of
deserving (sick and old) and undeserving (unemployed) beneficiaries explained as much as 80.6% of the
variance. Considering the theoretical reasons outlined above, we decided to keep these two dimensions apart.
7Ideological positioning on the left–right scale was not included in the models owing to a high level of
missing values in many countries (e.g., 36.7% missing in Russia, 32.5% in Portugal, and 27.8% in
Bulgaria). Income was also not controlled for due to high numbers of missing values (e.g., 58.6% missing
in Portugal, 39.2% in Greece, and 26.3% in Israel. Furthermore, information for the income variable was
completely missing for Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Slovakia. Running the models with income as a control did
not, however, change the main results.
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All individual-level predictors were group mean centered, meaning that the ef-
fects can be interpreted as pure within-country effects. On the country level, we
controlled for GDP per capita (centered) and the country means of dependency cul-
ture beliefs (also centered). The latter were included to examine context effects, that
is, whether the general level of perceived dependency culture in a country affects
individuals’ welfare support regardless of their own endorsement of dependency
culture beliefs. Context effects can be obtained by subtracting the individual-level
effect of dependency culture beliefs (within-effect) from the effect of country means
(between-effect).
Results
A total of 14% of the variation in support for the unemployed and 8% of the vari-
ation in support for the sick and the old was related to the country level (intra-class
correlations¼ .138 and .081, respectively), indicating that a multilevel approach was
warranted. In addition, the variance components on both individual and country levels
were larger for attitudes toward the unemployed, indicating that public opinion in
Europe is more divided on the role of government regarding jobs and unemployment
than old age and health care.
We first analyzed the relationship between dependency culture beliefs and welfare
support. Model 1b in Table 1 shows that perceived dependency culture decreases
both support for the unemployed and support for the sick and the old, even when
controlling for a number of sociodemographic and ideological variables.8 According to
hypothesis 1, dependency culture beliefs were expected to be stronger predictors of
welfare support for the unemployed than of welfare support for the sick and the old.
To test this, we ran, for each outcome variable separately, first a multilevel regression
model with all the individual-level predictors except for dependency culture beliefs
(see model 1a in Table 2), and, second, a model including this measure (model 1b in
Table 2). We then compared the model fit (2 Loglikelihood) of the two models. For
support for the unemployed as the outcome variable, the change in deviance scores
was 1,492.42. This difference score follows the chi-square distribution and is highly
significant with one degree of freedom (p< .001). With support for the sick and the
old as the outcome variable, the change in deviance scores was 607.56, which is also
highly significant with one degree of freedom (p< .001). Comparing the difference
scores across the models (1,492.42 and 607.56) shows that the improvement in model
fit after introducing dependency culture beliefs is, although significant in both cases,
clearly higher for support for the unemployed compared with support for the
sick and the old. The results thus suggest that while perceived dependency
8Egalitarianism was included as a control variable to get at the specific effect of dependency culture
beliefs, rather than some general value constellation. However, we also ran the models without controlling
for egalitarianism. In these analyses, most of the individual-level effects, including the effect of dependency
culture beliefs, became slightly larger. Overall, the interpretation of the results remains identical when
egalitarianism is removed from the models.
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culture is a stronger predictor of welfare support in the domain of jobs and unemploy-
ment, it is also a potent predictor in other policy domains such as health care and
old age.9
According to hypothesis 2, perceived dependency culture should be more strongly
related to lower welfare support in countries with higher levels of societal meritocracy.
First, we tested a model that allowed the slope of dependency culture beliefs to vary
across countries without including any country-level variables (model 2). Comparing
deviance scores against model 1b (without the random slope) showed that introducing
the random slope significantly improved the model fit for both dependent variables
with two degrees of freedom, meaning that the effect of dependency culture beliefs on
welfare attitudes varies across countries.
In support of our hypothesis that this variation should be related to the degree of
societal meritocracy, for both dependent variables a model including a cross-level
interaction between individual-level dependency culture beliefs and country-level mer-
itocracy (model 4) showed a significantly better model fit than model 3 (without the
cross-level interaction) with one degree of freedom. We see from Figure 1 illustrating
this effect (with support for the unemployed as the outcome variable) that the slope of
dependency culture beliefs is steeper in more meritocratic climates (two standard
deviations above the mean meritocracy level) than in less meritocratic climates (two
Figure 1
Societal level of meritocracy moderates the effect of dependency stereotypes on support for
the unemployed
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
Low dependency 
belief (-1 SD)
High dependency 
belief (+1 SD)
Low meritocracy
(- 2 SD)
High meritocracy
(+ 2 SD)
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9To show that culture of dependency differs from the concept of perceived deservingness, we ran the
models controlling for a 2-item measure of deservingness perceptions, consisting of the sum of the items:
‘‘Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job’’ and ‘‘Employees often pretend they are sick to
stay at home.’’ Deservingness perceptions were related to lower welfare support and their introduction
resulted in a small decrease in the effect of the culture of dependency measure. The fact that its effect
remained strongly significant clearly indicates the independent contributions of each dimension for explain-
ing welfare support. Furthermore, all other effects remained virtually unchanged by the introduction of the
deservingness measure. Full results for these analyses can be obtained from the authors.
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standard deviations below the mean meritocracy level). Country-level meritocracy
explained 25.9% of the random slope variance of dependency culture beliefs for
support for the unemployed and 21.6% for support for the sick and the old.
We also find a context effect of dependency culture beliefs in model 4. While the
individual-level effect of group-mean centered dependency culture beliefs reflects
the effect within countries (within-effect, .36 (p < .001) for support for the un-
employed), the country-level effect of country means of dependency culture beliefs
(between-effect, 1.65 (p < .001) for support for the unemployed) is a combination of
composition effect and context effect. The context effect can be calculated by sub-
tracting the within-effect from the between-effect [1.65  (.36)¼1.29, z¼ 4.15,
p< .001]. This effect suggests that even individuals with lower levels of personal
dependency culture beliefs were less supportive of welfare if surrounded by others
with high levels of such beliefs.
Conclusion
This study first showed that dependency culture beliefs were associated with more
negative attitudes toward welfare policies in favor of groups traditionally considered
undeserving (the unemployed), but also toward policies in favor of deserving groups
(the sick and the old). Second, in line with a social representations approach, we
demonstrated that this influence varied as a function of the prevalence of meritocratic
values in national contexts, thereby pointing to the importance of studying the role of
shared social representations in public opinion formation.
Using data from 29 European countries, we found that dependency culture beliefs
were potent predictors of welfare support above and beyond the effects of social
position and ideological variables. Although stronger in predicting support for the
unemployed, the relationship was also present for support for the sick and the old.
This finding suggests a spillover effect whereby a welfare dependency discourse that
mainly targets populations that can be blamed for their neediness is generalized to
undermine solidarity with groups such as the sick and the old that are generally
perceived as more deserving (van Oorschot, 2006).
We suggest that dependency culture beliefs are best understood as the representa-
tional outcome of perceived violations of central societal values (Staerkle´, 2009). As
abstract and general principles, values are exogenous to political attitudes and are
often used as a yardstick to evaluate the morality or appropriateness of behaviors or
outcomes (Feldman, 2003; Rokeach, 1973). Our findings are in line with research
showing that the more a group is seen as transgressing central values of self-reliance
and hard work, the more likely it is considered as undeserving of institutional support
(Henry & Reyna, 2007). Our findings further indicate that the more an institutional
action (in this case, welfare benefits and services) is perceived as violating central
values, the more likely it is rejected. The prevalence of dependency culture themes in
political and media discourse suggests that value violations can also be strategically
communicated for the purpose of moral inclusion and exclusion, that is, to include
some (such as the hard-working citizens) and to exclude others (such as the lazy
welfare abusers) from the moral community and entitlement to social rights
(Gibson, 2009; Opotow, 1990).
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With respect to the moderating role of societal meritocracy, we found that the role
of dependency culture beliefs in delegitimizing welfare support was stronger in more
meritocratic contexts. We also presented evidence for a context effect where even
individuals who did not endorse culture of dependency ideas expressed lower support
for the welfare state when surrounded by others with high levels of dependency
culture beliefs. These findings are consistent with a social representations approach,
as they underline the impact of the ideological context on opinion formation, for
example, through awareness of dominant values and beliefs in society. A long research
tradition in social influence and social representations has established the impact of
shared views on the way individuals interpret events and issues and form their
opinions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Moscovici, 2000; Noelle-Neumann, 1984). Our
findings on the moderating role of societal meritocracy suggest that public opinion
research may benefit from including normative contexts more systematically into
analytical models. In particular, the analysis of prevalent norms and values may
help account for the impact of stereotypes and prejudice toward minority and sub-
ordinate groups on a variety of key policy issues such as immigration, social welfare,
and crime.
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Appendix
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas of Dependency Culture Beliefs,
Meritocratic Beliefs, and Welfare Attitudes
Number of
items & scale
Dependency
culture beliefs
(3 items: 1–5)
Belief in
meritocracy
(single: 1–5)
Support
for the
unemployed
(2 items:
0–10)
Support for
the sick and
the old (2
items: 0–10)
M SD  M SD – M SD r M SD r
Country
Belgium 3.07 0.86 .77 3.38 1.05 – 6.15 1.72 .34 7.95 1.33 .63
Bulgaria 2.76 1.12 .92 3.35 1.15 – 7.23 2.42 .52 9.09 1.50 .82
Switzerland 3.00 0.86 .78 3.36 0.99 – 5.55 1.92 .36 7.43 1.73 .55
Cyprus 2.48 0.97 .90 3.33 1.10 – 7.09 1.88 .48 8.88 1.34 .78
Czech Republic 3.04 1.00 .82 3.87 1.00 – 6.21 2.31 .45 8.32 1.98 .78
Germany 3.02 0.86 .80 3.44 0.98 – 6.35 2.13 .42 7.99 1.66 .53
Denmark 2.85 0.85 .79 3.67 0.96 – 6.03 1.84 .42 8.58 1.26 .53
Estonia 2.49 0.88 .86 3.63 0.96 – 6.91 2.24 .55 8.66 1.49 .72
(continued)
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Continued
Number of
items & scale
Dependency
culture beliefs
(3 items: 1–5)
Belief in
meritocracy
(single: 1–5)
Support
for the
unemployed
(2 items:
0–10)
Support for
the sick and
the old (2
items: 0–10)
M SD  M SD – M SD r M SD r
Spain 2.80 0.90 .80 3.35 1.07 – 7.66 1.69 .47 8.88 1.19 .72
Finland 2.88 0.88 .82 2.68 1.12 – 7.10 1.55 .45 8.59 1.13 .64
France 3.29 1.01 .82 3.21 1.26 – 5.99 1.98 .40 7.98 1.52 .64
The U.K. 3.39 0.83 .81 3.51 0.97 – 5.97 1.97 .38 8.65 1.28 .57
Greece 2.43 0.96 .90 3.89 0.93 – 8.31 1.85 .61 9.06 1.42 .78
Croatia 2.89 0.99 .90 3.27 1.01 – 7.84 2.03 .62 8.81 1.64 .84
Hungary 3.21 1.07 .88 2.53 1.18 – 7.43 2.00 .40 8.90 1.55 .67
Ireland 3.20 0.86 .80 3.44 0.99 – 6.53 1.88 .43 8.52 1.48 .76
Israel 2.87 0.88 .83 3.44 1.10 – 7.64 1.99 .46 9.09 1.48 .83
Latvia 2.34 0.86 .90 3.75 0.93 – 8.48 1.82 .54 9.26 1.39 .83
The Netherlands 3.03 0.78 .74 3.42 0.93 – 5.82 1.60 .31 7.99 1.17 .51
Norway 2.99 0.74 .74 3.36 0.96 – 6.68 1.76 .40 8.81 1.20 .56
Poland 3.17 0.90 .82 3.63 0.93 – 6.71 2.26 .47 8.75 1.53 .73
Portugal 2.97 0.88 .80 3.22 1.05 – 7.24 1.95 .55 8.74 1.68 .84
Romania 2.98 0.96 .87 3.90 0.88 – 7.54 2.31 .61 7.95 2.30 .72
Russian Federation 2.34 0.91 .89 3.07 1.05 – 7.47 2.26 .43 9.18 1.55 .76
Sweden 2.82 0.80 .78 3.24 1.01 – 6.72 1.75 .48 8.59 1.29 .65
Slovenia 3.08 0.84 .82 2.94 1.03 – 6.85 1.98 .43 8.49 1.54 .71
Slovakia 3.07 0.93 .84 3.02 1.07 – 6.16 2.14 .47 8.42 1.79 .83
Turkey 3.09 1.13 .87 3.57 1.16 – 7.65 2.24 .60 8.23 2.14 .84
Ukraine 2.27 1.05 .90 3.70 1.16 – 8.52 1.94 .45 9.35 1.53 .78
All 29 countries 2.89 0.97 .85 3.39 1.09 – 6.95 2.15 .50 8.58 1.61 .72
M¼Mean; SD¼ standard deviation.
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